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Note
Ensuring Equal Access: Rethinking Enforcement
of Medicaid’s Equal Access Provision
Anne M. Dwyer*
In the summer of 2009, fifty-three-year-old Carol Vliet’s
1
cancer returned with renewed ferocity. With tumors metastasizing in her brain, liver, kidneys, and throat, she began yet
2
another punishing regimen of chemotherapy and radiation.
Her world crumbling around her, she managed to find a small
measure of comfort in her monthly visits with her long-time
3
primary care doctor. However, this sense of security quickly
vanished when her doctor informed her that he would no longer
4
be able to see her. Her Medicaid insurance paid him so little
5
that he could no longer afford to maintain her as a patient.
Unfortunately, Carol Vliet’s story is an all too common ex6
perience for Medicaid patients across the country. With the
poor economy fueling explosive growth in Medicaid enrollment
coupled with significant state budget shortfalls, Medicaid provider payments have become a primary target of many budget* J.D. and M.P.H. Candidate 2013, University of Minnesota Law School
and University of Minnesota School of Public Health. Thank you to Professor
Amy Monahan for her insight and guidance. Sincere thanks to my parents,
Charlene Dwyer, for helping me become a better writer and a better person
and John Dwyer, for giving me the confidence to take on any challenge. Special thanks to Corey Hade for his steadfast support and encouragement over
the past four years. Copyright © 2013 by Anne M. Dwyer.
1. Kevin Sack, As Medicaid Payments Shrink, Patients Are Abandoned,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/16/health/policy/
16medicaid.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See id. (stating reimbursements from Medicaid were so low that Carol
Vliet’s doctor was losing money every time a patient walked in his exam
room).
6. See, e.g., id. (trying to find a physician for their two-year-old son, one
parent felt like a “second-class citizen[]” after multiple doctors refused to accept their Medicaid insurance).
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7

cutting measures. Under the equal access provision of the
Medicaid Act, states are to consider the impact that provider
8
rate changes will have on access to care. Specifically, the provision requires that payments for covered care and services
“are consistent with efficiency, economy, and quality of care
and are sufficient to enlist enough providers so that care and
services are available under the plan at least to the extent that
such care and services are available to the general population
9
in the geographic area.”
Nevertheless, many states lower provider payment rates to
trim state budgets without analyzing the impact payment cuts
may have on the number of providers willing to accept patients
10
with Medicaid. As a result of reduced provider reimbursement
rates, the care and services available to Medicaid beneficiaries
is often not the same as the care and services available to the
11
general population. This has left many of the sixty million
Americans who rely on Medicaid without access to needed
12
care.
7. See id.; see also NICHOLAS JOHNSON ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY
PRIORITIES, AN UPDATE ON STATE BUDGET CUTS: AT LEAST 46 STATES HAVE
IMPOSED CUTS THAT HURT VULNERABLE RESIDENTS AND CAUSE JOB LOSS 9
(2011), available at http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=1214
(finding that twenty-two states have enacted cuts in Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance Program, including reduced or frozen reimbursements to health care providers).
8. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A) (2006) (“A State plan for medical assistance must . . . provide such methods and procedures . . . to assure that
payments are consistent with efficiency, economy, and quality of care and are
sufficient to enlist enough providers so that care and services are available
under the plan . . . .”).
9. Id.
10. See, e.g., Sack, supra note 1 (explaining that in 2009 Michigan cut
provider payments by an additional 8% to help close a large budget shortfall
leading to a reduction in participating providers).
11. See, e.g., Sandra L. Decker, In 2011 Nearly One-Third of Physicians
Said They Would Not Accept New Medicaid Patients, but Rising Fees May
Help, 31 HEALTH AFF. 1673, 1675 (2012) (finding that 31% of physicians were
unwilling to accept any new Medicaid patients compared to 17% unwilling to
accept new Medicare patients and 18% unwilling to accept new privately insured patients). One patient commented on her state-issued Medicaid insurance card, “It’s a useless piece of plastic. I can’t find an orthopedic surgeon or a
pain management doctor who will accept Medicaid.” Robert Pear, Cuts Leave
Patients with Medicaid Cards, but No Specialist to See, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1,
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/02/health/policy/02medicaid.html.
12. See KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & UNINSURED, KAISER FAMILY
FOUND., THE MEDICAID PROGRAM AT A GLANCE 1, 2 (2012), available at http://
www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7235-05.pdf [hereinafter MEDICAID PROGRAM AT
A GLANCE] (“Medicaid, the largest public health insurance program in the
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Traditionally, Medicaid beneficiaries and providers have
relied on the courts to enforce Medicaid’s equal access provision
13
and prevent harsh provider rate cuts. However, a number of
factors—including inconsistent circuit rulings interpreting the
legal requirements of Medicaid’s equal access provision, inconsistent court rulings concerning whether Medicaid beneficiaries
or providers are able to bring an equal access suit, and a number of other pragmatic and ethical considerations—have made
it increasingly difficult and impractical to employ judicial en14
forcement measures to ensure equal access.
This Note argues that because the current judicial enforcement mechanism is unable to adequately address equal
access violations, the federal government must implement an
alternative enforcement mechanism to ensure equal access to
care for Medicaid beneficiaries. Part I provides a brief overview
of the Medicaid program and the evolution of the judicial enforcement of Medicaid’s equal access provision. Part II explores
why the current judicial enforcement mechanism is unable to
adequately address these violations. Part III recommends implementation of a federal regulatory enforcement approach
supported by adequate financial assistance as an alternative
means to enforce Medicaid’s equal access provision. This Note
concludes that a robust federal regulatory scheme is an essential component of a Medicaid system that ensures access to
providers consistent with Medicaid’s equal access provision.

United States, covers over 60 million low-income individuals—roughly 1 in
every 5 Americans.”); see also Edward C. Wang et al., Inequality of Access to
Surgical Specialty Health Care: Why Children with Government-Funded Insurance Have Less Access than Those with Private Insurance in Southern California, 114 PEDIATRICS e584, e584 (2004), available at http://pediatrics
.aappublications.org/content/114/5/e584.full.html (finding that ninety-seven
surgeons would offer an office appointment to a child with commercial insurance compared to only twenty-seven surgeons for a child with Medi-Cal; reasons for not offering an office appointment or surgery for a child with Medi-Cal
included low monetary reimbursement); Pear, supra note 11 (“I have tried for
more than a year to find a child psychiatrist or psychologist to get [my son]
evaluated, but the mental health professionals in this area have told me they
absolutely do not take Medicaid.”).
13. See Abigail R. Moncrieff, Comment, Payments to Medicaid Doctors:
Interpreting the “Equal Access” Provision, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 673, 677 (2006)
(explaining that in attempts to enforce Medicaid’s equal access provision,
“providers and patients have sued state health agencies, claiming that stateset rates are legally insufficient”).
14. See infra Part II.
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I. MEDICAID’S EQUAL ACCESS PROVISION

Medicaid’s equal access provision operates within the larger framework of the Medicaid program. Accordingly, this Part
first provides a brief overview of the development and structure
of the Medicaid program. It then examines Medicaid’s provider
payment policy, its effects on provider participation, and the
role of Medicaid’s equal access provision in ensuring access to
care. Finally, this Part explores the evolution of judicial enforcement of Medicaid’s equal access provision.
A. THE MEDICAID PROGRAM
15

Prior to enactment of the Medicaid Act in 1965, America
had a two-tiered, income-based healthcare system. Wealthy
Americans in the top tier were cared for by private providers
while the nation’s poor occupied the bottom tier where their access to care was limited to emergency rooms and charitable
16
hospitals.
17
Codified as Title XIX of the Social Security Act, the Medicaid Act was intended to address America’s separate and unequal two-tiered health care system by providing passage for
many of the nation’s poor and disabled into the upper tier of the
18
health care system. As a result, the creation of the Medicaid
program represented a fundamental philosophical shift in how
the government viewed its role in caring for the health of the
19
poor and disabled. It significantly expanded the government’s
role in financing health care and codified access by medically
20
indigent persons to “mainstream” medical care. At present,
the four main categories of low-income individuals covered by
the Medicaid program are children and their caretakers, preg-

15. Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 343 (1965) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1396 (2006)).
16. Rosemary B. Guiltinan, Note, Enforcing a Critical Entitlement:
Preemption Claims as an Alternative Way to Protect Medicaid Recipients’ Access to Healthcare, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1583, 1590 (2010); Moncrieff, supra note 13,
at 675.
17. 79 Stat. 343.
18. Moncrieff, supra note 13, at 675 (citing Medicare and Medicaid: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 91st Cong. 57 (1970) (statement of Hon.
John G. Veneman, Under Secretary, Dep’t of Health, Educ., and Welfare)).
19. Sara Rosenbaum, Medicaid at Forty: Revisiting Structure and Meaning in a Post-Deficit Reduction Act Era, 9 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 5, 9
(2006).
20. Id.
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nant women, people with disabilities, and the elderly. In addition, under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
states have the option of extending Medicaid coverage to individuals not presently eligible for the program, including child22
less adults. As a result, Medicaid enrollment is expected to in23
crease by four to fifteen million between 2012 and 2021.
Medicaid is structured as a cooperative federal-state program in which the federal government provides partial financial assistance to states so that they may furnish health care to
24
low-income individuals. In order to participate in the Medicaid program and receive federal matching funds, a state must
have a Medicaid plan that is approved by the Secretary of
25
Health and Human Services (HHS). The state plan must describe the scope and nature of the state’s Medicaid program
26
and comply with the requirements of the Medicaid Act. As one
of the federal government’s grant-in-aid programs, enacted under Congress’s Spending Clause powers, a state’s receipt of federal Medicaid funds is conditioned on compliance with federal
27
requirements. If a state wishes to change the way its Medicaid program is administered, it must submit a state plan
amendment for a determination as to whether the proposed
28
change complies with federal requirements. If the federal government finds that the plan does not comply with the Medicaid
Act, the Secretary of HHS has the authority to abolish the
29
state’s federal Medicaid funding.
21. Guiltinan, supra note 16, at 1590 (“Income, immigration, and residency restrictions must also be met.”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A) (2006).
22. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,
§ 2001, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (expanding Medicaid eligibility to individuals
with incomes at or below 133% of the federal poverty level).
23. DELOITTE, ISSUE BRIEF: STATE MEDICAID PROGRAM MANAGEMENT
UPDATE AND CONSIDERATIONS 4 (2012), available at http://www.deloitte.com/
assets/Dcom-UnitedStates/Local%20Assets/Documents/Health%20Reform%
20Issues%20Briefs/us_chs_2012StateMedicaidProgramManagement_092012
.pdf.
24. See Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 502 (1990) (discussing the
structure and functions of the Medicaid program).
25. ANDY SCHNEIDER ET AL., KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & UNINSURED,
THE MEDICAID RESOURCE BOOK 136 (2002), available at http://www.kff.org/
medicaid/2236-index.cfm.
26. Guiltinan, supra note 16, at 1590.
27. Rosenbaum, supra note 19, at 10; see also SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra
note 25, at 134 (“There are 63 separate federal statutory requirements that
state Medicaid plans must meet.”).
28. SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 25, at 136.
29. Id.
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Although state participation in the Medicaid program is
30
entirely voluntary, every state has chosen to participate. Under the Medicaid Act, states are given responsibility for administering the program on a day-to-day basis within broad re31
quirements set by the federal government. Within these broad
federal guidelines, states maintain a large degree of flexibility
in operating the program, including determining eligibility requirements, establishing the scope of covered benefits, and set32
ting rates for provider reimbursement. As a result of this flexibility, each state has a separate and distinct Medicaid program
with significantly different eligibility, benefits, and provider
33
payment policies.
B. MEDICAID PROVIDER PAYMENT POLICY
State Medicaid programs vary widely; however, a basic
commonality among them is their reliance on the private sector
34
to provide care for Medicaid beneficiaries. In procuring access
to care, each state Medicaid program typically interacts with
35
private providers in one of two ways. Under a fee-for-service
approach, the state acts as a third-party payer and purchases
private-market health care on behalf of Medicaid beneficiar36
ies. Alternatively, under a managed care approach, the state
contracts with private managed care organizations on a capi37
38
tated rate basis to provide care to Medicaid participants.
States generally have flexibility to decide whether to buy cov39
ered services on a fee-for-service or managed care basis.
30. Id. at 130.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Moncrieff, supra note 13, at 676.
35. The term “providers” includes individual physicians, hospitals, nursing homes, dentists, and non-physician health practitioners including nurses
and psychologists. Id. at 674 n.8.
36. Id. at 676; SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 25, at 141.
37. See SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 25, at 102 (describing how fee-forservice rates are influential in setting capitation rates). Under a capitated
payment system, a “physician, hospital, or other health care provider is paid a
set rate for each member . . . regardless of the number or nature of services
provided.” FREE DICTIONARY, http://medical-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/
capitation (last visited Mar. 9, 2013).
38. See SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 25, at 141–42 (describing rates payable to managed care organizations); Moncrieff, supra note 13, at 676 (stating
that Medicaid “pays private managed care organizations (MCOs) to provide
both insurance and services to Medicaid patients”).
39. SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 25, at 141.
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States also have broad discretion in setting Medicaid pro40
vider payment rates. Federal regulations impose upper limits
on the amount state Medicaid programs can pay for certain institutional services as well as outpatient hospital and clinical
41
services. There are, however, no federal requirements controlling floors on Medicaid payment rates to physicians and other
42
individual providers.
Originally, a provision of the Medicaid Act referred to as
the Boren Amendment governed states’ Medicaid payments to
43
certain institutional care facilities. Payments to these providers had to be sufficient to cover the cost of “efficiently and eco44
nomically operated facilities.” However, in 1997 the Boren
Amendment was repealed leaving no federal floor governing
45
payment rates to institutional providers. As a result, Medicaid
46
payment methodologies and levels vary considerably by state.
Nevertheless, the Medicaid Act does, through its equal access
provisions, indirectly constrain states’ otherwise broad discre47
tion to set Medicaid reimbursement rates.
Provider participation in the Medicaid program is option48
al. There are a variety of factors that influence provider participation in the Medicaid program, including “the administrative burden of billing Medicaid, delays in payment, capacity

40. Id.
41. Id. The institutional services include “inpatient hospital, nursing facilities, and intermediate care facilities for the mentally retarded.” Id.; see also
42 C.F.R. § 447.1–.56 (2011).
42. However, two groups of fee-for-service providers are protected by
payment floors: federally-qualified health centers and hospice facilities.
SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 25, at 141.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(A) (1994) (repealed 1997).
44. Id.
45. SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 25, at 141.
46. See DEBORAH BACHRACH, CTR. FOR HEALTH CARE STRATEGIES, PAYMENT REFORM: CREATING A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE FOR MEDICAID 2 (2010),
available at http://www.chcs.org/usr_doc/Medicaid_Payment_Reform_Brief
.pdf.
47. Citing separate access review procedures set forth in Part 438 of the
Code of the Federal Regulations, the federal government takes the position
that this provision does not apply to managed care arrangements. See Medicaid Program; Methods for Assuring Access to Covered Medicaid Services, 76
Fed. Reg. 26,342, 25,343 (proposed May 6, 2011) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt.
447).
48. Sean Jessee, Comment, Fulfilling the Promise of the Medicaid Act:
Why the Equal Access Clause Creates Privately Enforceable Rights, 58 EMORY
L.J. 791, 796–98 (2009).
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constraints, and high clinical burdens.” However, one of the
most commonly cited reasons for refraining from participation
50
in the Medicaid program is inadequate reimbursement. If
providers are able to fill their schedules with higherreimbursing privately insured patients, then they have no financial incentive to take Medicaid patients. Accordingly, because states rely on private providers to furnish care to Medicaid beneficiaries, ensuring that states adequately reimburse
providers is essential to ensuring that a sufficient number of
providers enroll in and accept patients from the Medicaid pro51
gram.
Acknowledging the importance of provider participation in
the Medicaid program, in 1989 Congress amended the Medicaid
Act in response to attempts by states to restrain provider pay52
ment rates as a way of controlling program costs. With the
enactment of the equal access provision, states were required to
reimburse providers at a level that promoted efficiency and

49. MEDICAID & CHIP PAYMENT & ACCESS COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONMEDICAID AND CHIP 132 (2011), available at http://healthreform.kff
.org/~/media/Files/KHS/docfinder/MACPAC_March2011_web.pdf [hereinafter
MEDICAID & CHIP PAYMENT]; see also Steve Berman et al., Factors that Influence the Willingness of Private Primary Care Pediatricians to Accept More
Medicaid Patients, 110 PEDIATRICS 239, 243 (2002) (finding that states with
higher average concerns about Medicaid paperwork had lower pediatrician
provider participation rates); Peter J. Cunningham & Ann S. O’Malley, Do Reimbursement Delays Discourage Medicaid Participation by Physicians?, 28
HEALTH AFF. w17, w17 (2009) (finding that payment delays and administrative burdens affect provider participation in Medicaid).
50. See Wang et al., supra note 12, at e586 (finding that among surgeons
surveyed, 92% cited low monetary reimbursement for surgery as a reason for
not offering surgery for children with Medi-Cal); see also Berman et al., supra
note 49, at 244 (finding that low payment rates relate to low Medicaid participating by primary care office-based pediatricians); Decker, supra note 11, at
1676 (finding that acceptance rates of new Medicaid patients were higher in
states with higher Medicaid-to-Medicare fee ratios).
51. See Wang et al., supra note 12, at e586 (describing how surgeons refused to take Medi-Cal patients based on low reimbursement rates).
52. A Congressional Report issued by the House Committee on the Budget
noted, “As the National Governors’ Association testified before the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment . . . ‘States have restrained physician fees
as one method of controlling program costs.’” H.R. REP. NO. 101-247, at 390
(1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1906, 2116. As a result, the report concluded that although “the Committee recognizes that payment levels are only
one determinant of physician participation . . . the Committee believes that,
without adequate payment levels, it is simply unrealistic to expect physicians
to participate in the program.” Id.
GRESS ON
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economy but also ensured quality of care and sufficient provid53
er participation.
Nonetheless, many states reduce provider reimbursement
rates in an attempt to cut Medicaid costs and decrease state
54
budget deficits. Insufficient provider reimbursement rates
have led to violations of Medicaid’s equal access provision. For
example, one study found that of office-based primary care
physicians only 65% were accepting new Medicaid patients,
compared to 74% for Medicare and 88% for privately insured
55
patients. Another study found that in states with the lowest
provider payment rates, only about half of primary care pediatricians are willing to serve Medicaid patients who request
56
care.
Unfortunately, the adverse impact of low Medicaid provider payments has been further exacerbated by the economic cri57
sis. The recession left millions of individuals without jobs and,
as a result, without their accompanying employer-based health
58
insurance. With few if any other options, many individuals
59
turned to Medicaid for access to health care. As a result, Med60
icaid enrollment has risen considerably since 2008.
In 2009, the federal government stepped in to provide
states with extra federal matching funds to help cover Medicaid
cost increases resulting from the large number of new enrol53. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A) (2006) (requiring that payments for
covered care and services “are consistent with efficiency, economy, and quality
of care and are sufficient to enlist enough providers so that care and services
are available under the plan at least to the extent that such care and services
are available to the general population in the geographic area”).
54. See Medicaid Program; Methods for Assuring Access to Covered Medicaid Services, 76 Fed. Reg. 26,342, 26,343 (proposed May 6, 2011) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 447) (describing how some states are lowering payments
in difficult fiscal times).
55. MEDICAID & CHIP PAYMENT, supra note 49, at 132.
56. Berman et al., supra note 49, at 243.
57. See Phil Galewitz, State Medicaid Spending Skyrockets, KAISER
HEALTH NEWS (Oct. 27, 2011), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/stories/2011/
october/27/state-medicaid-spending-increase.aspx (describing how states will
have to make up for the end of stimulus money).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See id. (finding that Medicaid enrollment grew by 3% in 2008, 7.8% in
2009, and 7.2% in 2010). Between June 2010 and June 2011, an additional 2.2
million people enrolled in the Medicaid program (a 4.4% growth rate). KAISER
COMM’N ON MEDICAID & UNINSURED, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICAID AND
MANAGED CARE: KEY DATA, MEDICAID ENROLLMENT: JUNE 2011 DATA SNAPSHOT 1 (2012), available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/8050-05.pdf.
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lees. That subsidy ended in June of 2011. With the end of increased federal Medicaid matching funds and the ongoing economic instability, many states have been left with significant
63
budget shortfalls.
Unfortunately, Medicaid has become a primary target of
many state budget-cutting measures further exacerbating the
64
problem of low provider payment rates. Federal law currently
65
limits states’ authority to cut back Medicaid enrollment. Consequently, reducing provider reimbursement rates is seen as
one of the main ways to reduce Medicaid costs and save state
66
dollars. In 2012, forty-five states reduced provider payment
67
rates and forty-two states plan on further cuts in 2013.
C. ENFORCEMENT OF MEDICAID’S EQUAL ACCESS PROVISION
The Medicaid Act does not promulgate specific administrative procedures allowing Medicaid beneficiaries or providers to
enforce the equal access provision through administrative ac68
tion. As a result, both Medicaid beneficiaries and providers rely on judicial enforcement via lawsuits brought against state
61. See Galewitz, supra note 57 (stating that federal stimulus funds provided states with an additional $87 billion in federal funding for Medicaid).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See id. (stating that forty-six states plan on lowering provider payments); see also N.C. Aizenman, State Spending on Medicaid up Sharply,
WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health
-science/state-spending-on-medicaid-up-sharply/2011/10/27/gIQAxbjSNM_
story.html (stating that many states have “turned to tough measures to trim
Medicaid costs, such as . . . reducing payment rates to doctors and hospitals”);
Tami Luhby, Medicaid Costs Balloon for Cash-Strapped States, CNN MONEY
(Oct.
27,
2011),
http://www.money.cnn.com/2011/10/27/news/economy/
Medicaid_state_spending/index.htm (arguing that states “have aggressively
been trying to reduce their Medicaid costs . . . especially since the stimulus
and health care reform acts restricted them from cutting enrollment”).
65. The 2010 health law contains a “maintenance of effort” provision,
which bars states from tightening their eligibility rules for Medicaid through
2014, when Medicaid will be expanded to cover currently ineligible individuals
mainly at the federal government’s expense. Aizenman, supra note 64.
66. Galewitz, supra note 57; see also Luhby, supra note 64 (stating that
slashing provider payment rates has been the most common strategy to reduce
Medicaid costs).
67. VERNON K. SMITH ET AL., KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & UNINSURED, MEDICAID TODAY; PREPARING FOR TOMORROW: A LOOK AT STATE
MEDICAID PROGRAM SPENDING, ENROLLMENT AND POLICY TRENDS 7 (2012),
available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/8380.pdf (referring to fiscal
years 2012 and 2013).
68. Jessee, supra note 48, at 799.
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Medicaid agencies as the provision’s main enforcement mecha69
nism.
Prior to 2002, Medicaid providers and patients relied on
§ 1983 of the Civil Rights Act to enforce Medicaid’s equal access
70
provision. Section 1983 allows citizens to bring private rights
of action against state officials in order to enforce constitutional
71
and federal statutory rights. In the 1980 case Maine v.
Thiboutot, the Supreme Court held that in addition to protecting constitutional rights, § 1983 also protects federal statutory
72
rights. As a result of this holding, a plaintiff could invoke
§ 1983 to seek redress for a violation of a statutory right conferred by a federal statute which does not otherwise include a
73
private right of action, like the Medicaid Act.
Following the Supreme Court’s holding that federal statutes can create enforceable rights under § 1983, in 1990 the
Court found that the Medicaid Act created an individual feder74
al right enforceable under § 1983. In Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Ass’n, the Court held that the Boren Amendment conferred

69. See Moncrieff, supra note 13, at 677 (explaining that in attempts to
enforce Medicaid’s equal access provision, providers and patients have sued
state health agencies, claiming that state-set rates are legally insufficient).
70. See ALAN E. SCHABES ET AL., HEALTH LAW HANDBOOK § 6:7 (2006)
(explaining that in 2002 the Supreme Court modified other requirements for
stating a cause of action under § 1983); Jessee, supra note 48, at 799–802 (explaining Supreme Court guidelines for enforcing a statutory right under
§ 1983).
71. Guiltinan, supra note 16, at 1596 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Maine
v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (“Every
person who, under color of any [state] statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any . . . person . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable . . . .” (emphasis added)); Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 4
(finding that the phrase “and laws,” suggests that the § 1983 remedy broadly
encompasses violations of federal statutory as well as constitutional law).
72. Guiltinan, supra note 16, at 1596 (citing Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 4).
73. Id. (citing Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 5). The Supreme Court later clarified
the test for determining whether a particular statutory provision gives rise to
a federal right enforceable via § 1983. In Blessing v. Freestone, the Court held
that to successfully enforce a federally conferred statutory right a plaintiff
must show that: (1) Congress intended the provision in question to benefit the
plaintiff; (2) the statutory right asserted is not “so vague and amorphous that
its enforcement would strain judicial competence;” and (3) the statute unambiguously imposes a binding obligation on the state in “mandatory rather than
precatory terms.” Id. at 1596–97 (quoting Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329,
340–41 (1997)).
74. See Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 509–10 (1990).
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on Medicaid providers a right to “reasonable and adequate” re75
imbursement rates.
After the Court’s finding in Wilder, Medicaid providers and
recipients across the country initiated suits under § 1983 to enforce various provisions of the Medicaid Act, including the
76
equal access provision. In some cases, equal access suits
brought by Medicaid recipients and providers pursuant to
§ 1983 were successful in preventing state Medicaid programs
77
from reducing provider reimbursement rates. For example,
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found that a reduction in
provider reimbursement rates by Arkansas’s Medicaid program
violated the equal access provision because the impact of the
20% rate reduction on access, economy, efficiency, and quality
78
of care had not been considered.
However, in 2002 the Supreme Court adjusted the requirements for stating a cause of action under § 1983, severely
limiting the ability of Medicaid providers and beneficiaries to
bring an equal access claim against the state by way of
79
§ 1983. In Gonzaga University v. Doe, the Court disallowed a
§ 1983 claim brought under Spending Clause legislation, finding that the legislation did not create the type of individual
80
right enforceable under § 1983. The Court held that only unambiguously conferred “rights, not . . . broader or vaguer ‘bene81
fits’ or ‘interests,’” are enforceable under § 1983.
Following the Court’s decision in Gonzaga, federal courts
have generally accepted § 1983 claims brought pursuant to
provisions within the Medicaid Act that reference “individuals”
75. Id. at 512. The Boren Amendment has since been repealed. See supra
notes 43–45 and accompanying text.
76. Guiltinan, supra note 16, at 1598; id. at 1598 n.109 (citing Visiting
Nurse Ass’n of N. Shore, Inc. v. Bullen, 93 F.3d 997, 1005 (1st Cir. 1996);
Methodist Hosps., Inc. v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1026, 1029 (7th Cir. 1996); Ark.
Med. Soc’y, Inc. v. Reynolds, 6 F.3d 519, 527–28 (8th Cir. 1993)).
77. Guiltinan, supra note 16, at 1598 n.110 (citing Reynolds, in which the
court found that Arkansas’s reduction in provider payments violated the equal
access provision and comparing it to the decision in Sullivan, in which the
court held that Indiana’s Medicaid program did not violate the equal access
provision in setting reimbursement rates).
78. Id.
79. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 282–83 (2002) (adjusting the first
prong of the Blessing test to require an “unambiguously conferred” right to
bring a § 1983 claim). See Guiltinan, supra note 16, at 1599–1600 for a more
comprehensive analysis of the Gonzaga decision.
80. 536 U.S. at 276; see also, SCHABES ET AL., supra note 70.
81. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 283.
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82

or “families,” and rejected § 1983 claims brought to enforce
83
provisions containing broader, more generalized language.
This has created a split among the federal circuits as to whether the language of the equal access provision confers individual
84
rights on Medicaid beneficiaries enforceable under § 1983. As
a result, beneficiaries in many states are left without legal re85
course in the case of Medicaid equal access violations. In addition, since 2002, every federal circuit court that has considered
a § 1983 equal access claim brought by providers has held that
the language of the equal access provision does not confer indi86
vidual rights on Medicaid providers. Consequently, enforcement of the equal access provision under a § 1983 cause of action is constructively prohibited for providers.
Due to the erosion of private rights of action under § 1983,
some Medicaid beneficiaries and providers have turned to the
Supremacy Clause to provide an alternative cause of action in
pursuing judicial enforcement of Medicaid’s equal access provi87
sion. Under the Supremacy Clause’s preemption doctrine,
state laws are deemed invalid if they are contrary to or inter88
fere with federal law. In the 2008 Ninth Circuit case Inde82. Guiltinan, supra note 16, at 1599 & n.120 (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396a(a)(10)(A) (2006); Watson v. Weeks, 436 F.3d 1152, 1159–60 (9th Cir.
2006); S.D. ex rel. Dickson v. Hood, 391 F.3d 581, 603 (5th Cir. 2004); Sabree
ex rel. Sabree v. Richman, 367 F.3d 180, 183 (3d Cir. 2004)).
83. Guiltinan, supra note 16, at 1599–1600; id. at 1599 n.121 (citing
Equal Access for El Paso, Inc. v. Hawkins, 509 F.3d 697, 703 (5th Cir. 2007);
Mandy R. ex rel. Mr. & Mrs. R. v. Owens, 464 F.3d 1139, 1148 (10th Cir. 2006);
Westside Mothers v. Olszewski, 454 F.3d 532, 542–43 (6th Cir. 2006); Sanchez
v. Johnson, 416 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2005); Long Term Care Pharmacy
Alliance v. Ferguson, 362 F.3d 50, 58–59 (1st Cir. 2004)).
84. Compare supra note 83 and cases cited, with Bontrager v. Ind. Family
& Soc. Servs. Admin., 697 F.3d 604, 607 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding that the
plaintiff could bring a § 1983 claim based on rights in § 1396a(a)(10(A) of the
Medicaid Act), and Pediatric Specialty Care, Inc. v. Ark. Dep’t of Human
Servs., 443 F.3d 1005, 1015–16 (8th Cir. 2006) (same), vacated on other
grounds sub nom. Selig v. Pediatric Specialty Care, Inc., 551 U.S. 1142, 1142
(2007).
85. See supra note 83.
86. See Bradley J. Sayles, Preemption or Bust: A Review of the Recent
Trends in Medicaid Preemption Actions, 27 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y
120, 130–31 (2010) (examining the evolution of equal access claims under a
§ 1983 cause of action post-Gonzaga); see also, e.g., sources cited supra note 83.
87. SCHABES ET AL., supra note 70, § 6:7.
88. See U.S. CONST. art. VI; Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666 (1962) (“The
relative importance to the State of its own law is not material when there is a
conflict with a valid federal law, for the Framers of our Constitution provided
that the federal law must prevail.”).
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pendent Living Center of Southern California, Inc. v. Shewry,
Medicaid providers and beneficiaries successfully argued that
Medicaid’s equal access provision could be enforced through an
89
implied cause of action under the Supremacy Clause. The suit
was a result of the passage of several laws by the California
90
Legislature reducing Medicaid provider payment rates. Medicaid providers and beneficiaries challenged the rate reductions,
arguing that the cuts violated—and were thus preempted by—
91
Medicaid’s equal access provision. In upholding the plaintiff’s
preemption claim, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the state
Medicaid Director did in fact violate the federal Medicaid equal
access provision when he implemented rate reductions man92
dated by the state legislature.
However, the Supremacy Clause basis for judicial enforcement of the equal access provision may be in jeopardy. In January of 2011, the Supreme Court granted the Independent Liv93
ing defendant’s petition for writ of certiorari. In a 5-4 decision
issued in February of 2012, the Court declined to resolve the
question of whether Medicaid providers and beneficiaries stat94
ed a valid cause of action under the Supremacy Clause. The
Court, finding that actions taken by the State since the suit
was filed changed the facts of the case, vacated the judgment
and remanded the case back to the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap95
peals. Should the Court eventually find that the Supremacy
89. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc. v. Shewry, 543 F.3d 1047, 1048–49
(9th Cir. 2008) [hereinafter Indep. Living Ctr. I] (holding that a plaintiff may
bring suit under the Supremacy Clause “regardless of whether the federal
statute at issue confers an express ‘right’”), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2828
(2009), on remand to No. CV 08-3315, 2008 WL 3891211 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 18,
2008), aff’d sub nom. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc. v. Maxwell-Jolly, 572
F.3d 644 (9th Cir. 2009) [hereinafter Indep. Living Ctr. II], motion to vacate
denied, 590 F.3d 725 (9th Cir. 2009).
90. Robert Pear, Administration Opposes Challenges to Medicaid Cuts,
N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/29/us/29medicaid
.html.
91. Id.
92. Indep. Living Ctr. II, 572 F.3d at 648, 625.
93. Maxwell-Jolly v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 590 F.3d 725 (9th
Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 78 U.S.L.W. 3500 (U.S. Jan. 18, 2011) (No. 09-958).
94. Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204, 1211–12
(2012).
95. Id. Since the case was filed, the federal government approved some
elements of California’s proposed rate changes. California also withdrew other
proposed rate changes being challenged in the case. See Jason Millman,
SCOTUS Punts on California Medicaid Suit, POLITICO (Feb. 22, 2012, 11:20
AM), http://politico.com/news/stories/0212/73165.html. As a result of these actions, on remand, the Ninth Circuit rejected the Plaintiff’s Supremacy Clause
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Clause does not provide a valid cause of action, many Medicaid
providers and beneficiaries will again be unable to enforce Medicaid’s equal access provision through legal action.
II. INADEQUACY OF THE CURRENT JUDICIAL
ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM
While the Supreme Court has not directly ruled on whether Medicaid beneficiaries and providers are able to enforce
96
Medicaid’s equal access provision through § 1983 or under the
97
Supremacy Clause, there are a number of factors that suggest
that the current judicial enforcement mechanism is not a suitable instrument for addressing equal access violations. This
Part first explores the inconsistent circuit rulings interpreting
the legal requirements of Medicaid’s equal access provision.
Then, it examines the inconsistent court rulings concerning
whether Medicaid beneficiaries or providers are even able to
bring a Medicaid equal access suit. Finally, this Part concludes
that even if the Supreme Court upholds judicial enforcement of
Medicaid’s equal access provision through a § 1983 cause of action or under the Supremacy Clause, judicial enforcement does
not comport with congressional intent, federal administrative
interpretation, or practical, economic and ethical considerations.
A. INTERPRETING THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS OF MEDICAID’S
EQUAL ACCESS PROVISION: INCONSISTENT CIRCUIT RULINGS
At present, the Third, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits allow
Medicaid beneficiaries to bring private rights of action in order
98
to enforce Medicaid’s equal access provision while the Ninth
claim, finding that “[p]laintiffs are unlikely to succeed on the merits of their
Supremacy Clause claims against the Director because—even assuming that
the Supremacy Clause provides a private right of action—the Secretary has
reasonably determined that the State’s reimbursement rates comply with
§ 30(A).” Managed Pharmacy Care v. Sebelius, 705 F.3d 934, 939 (9th Cir.
2012). On January 29, 2013, Plaintiffs submitted a petition for rehearing and
rehearing en banc. Joint Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc at 1,
Sebelius, 705 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2012) (No. 12-55067), available at http://www
.cmanet.org/files/assets/news/2013/01/petition-for-rehearing-.pdf.
96. See Bontrager v. Ind. Family & Soc. Servs. Admin., 697 F.3d 604, 607
(7th Cir. 2012).
97. See Douglas, 132 S. Ct. at 1211–12.
98. See Bontrager v. Ind. Family & Soc. Servs. Admin., 697 F.3d 604, 607
(7th Cir. 2012); Pediatric Specialty Care, Inc. v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs.,
443 F.3d 1005, 1015–16 (8th Cir. 2006), vacated on other grounds sub nom.
Selig v. Pediatric Specialty Care, Inc., 551 U.S. 1142, 1142 (2007); Pa. Phar-
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Circuit allowed plaintiffs to bring suit for injunctive relief un99
der the Supremacy Clause. However, judicial enforcement has
resulted in inconsistent rulings on what the equal access provi100
sion actually requires. As a consequence, states have been
left without clear and consistent guidelines, creating a high degree of uncertainty for states attempting to adjust their provid101
er payment rates.
States in the Ninth Circuit are required to satisfy specific
procedural requirements before setting Medicaid reimburse102
ment rates. The Ninth Circuit has determined compliance
with Medicaid’s equal access provision based solely on the
103
state’s rate-setting procedures. In Orthopaedic Hospital v.
Belshe, several hospitals brought legal action against California
alleging that it violated Medicaid’s equal access provision when
104
it lowered Medicaid hospital reimbursement rates. The court
held that the equal access provision requires state agencies to
set payment rates that “bear a reasonable relationship” to provider costs, based on “responsible cost studies, its own or oth105
ers’, that provide reliable data as basis for its rate setting.”
Finding that the state failed to meet these requirements, the
court remanded the case, holding that the state should “undertake responsible cost studies that will provide reliable data as
to the hospitals’ costs . . . . [and] then set rates that have some
reasonable relation to such costs, [with] the state bearing the

macists Ass’n v. Houstoun, 283 F.3d 531, 543–44 (3d Cir. 2002) (en banc). The
First, Second, and Fourth Circuits have not directly addressed whether Medicaid beneficiaries are allowed to bring private rights of action under Medicaid’s equal access provision.
99. See Indep. Living Ctr. I, 543 F.3d 1047, 1048–49 (9th Cir. 2008); cf.
Sanchez v. Johnson, 416 F.3d 1051, 1051 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that Medicaid’s equal access provision does not create an individual right enforceable
under § 1983 by Medicaid beneficiaries or providers).
100. See generally Moncrieff, supra note 13 (providing an in-depth discussion of the circuit split).
101. See Medicaid Program; Methods for Assuring Access to Covered Medicaid Services, 76 Fed. Reg. 26,342, 25,343 (proposed May 6, 2011) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 447).
102. See Orthopaedic Hosp. v. Belshe, 103 F.3d 1491, 1500 (9th Cir. 1997)
(requiring states to base rate changes on “reliable data” provided by “responsible cost studies”).
103. Moncrieff, supra note 13, at 688.
104. Orthopaedic Hosp., 103 F.3d at 1492.
105. Id. at 1496, 1500. This ruling was reaffirmed by the Ninth Circuit after the repeal of the Boren Amendment. See Independent Living Ctr. II, 572
F.3d 644, 645 (9th Cir. 2009).
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burden of justifying any rate that substantially deviates from
106
such determined costs.”
The Third and Eighth Circuits on the other hand, require
states to engage in some kind of decision-making process, but
do not go as far as the Ninth Circuit in laying out strict proce107
dural requirements. In considering a challenge to a state’s
decision to cut pharmacy reimbursement rates, the Third Circuit rejected the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation that the equal
access provision requires states to base rate changes on reliable
108
data provide by responsible cost studies. Instead, the court
employed a more deferential interpretation, holding that the
state “may not act arbitrarily and capriciously” in setting reimbursement rates by showing it “made a reasonable effort to an109
ticipate the effects of its action.” Applying this more deferential equal access interpretation, the court found that although
the state “might have done a better job in its review by considering systematically and thoroughly all the implications of its
rate revisions,” the deficiencies in the agency’s decision-making
110
did “not make the overall process arbitrary and capricious.”
Consequently, courts in the Third and Eighth Circuits will defer to a state’s reimbursement rate-setting decision if the state
can show that it made a rational decision based on the consid111
eration of relevant factors, whatever those factors may be.

106. Orthopaedic Hosp., 103 F.3d at 1500.
107. See Moncrieff, supra note 13, at 698–99 (discussing the Third and
Eighth Circuits’ arbitrary and capricious review in Medicaid equal access cases).
108. Rite Aid of Pa., Inc. v. Houstoun, 171 F.3d 842, 851–53 (3d Cir. 1999)
(noting the lack of procedural requirements in § 1396a(a)(30)(A) as compared
to the repealed Boren Amendment).
109. Id. at 852–55.
110. Id. at 854–55.
111. For a more extensive discussion of the Third and Eighth Circuit procedural requirements, see Moncrieff, supra note 13, at 698–99. As noted by
Abigail Moncrieff, in Rite Aid, the Third Circuit laid out specific relevant factors in finding the state’s decision was not arbitrary and capricious including:
consideration of “private payer’s rates, neighboring state’s rates, and pharmaceutical companies’ prices.” Id. (citing Rite Aid, 171 F.3d at 848). However, in
applying the arbitrary and capricious standard in Reynolds, the Eighth Circuit
only referred to general factors such as efficiency, economy, quality and access.
See id. (citing Ark. Med. Soc’y, Inc. v. Reynolds, 6 F.3d 519, 530–31 (8th Cir.
1993)). In addition, the Reynolds court did not state whether consideration of
all or just some of these factors was necessary. See id. Rather, the Reynolds
court simply stated that reimbursement decisions based exclusively on budgetary considerations were insufficient. See id.
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Unlike the more lenient procedural requirements set forth
by the Third and Eighth Circuits, the Seventh Circuit does not
require states to engage in any comprehensive procedural pro112
cess before reducing provider payment rates. In Methodist
Hospitals, Inc. v. Sullivan, physicians and hospitals brought an
action against state officials seeking to enjoin implementation
of the state’s new rules affecting Medicaid reimbursement for
113
outpatient and physician services. The plaintiffs argued that
the state violated Medicaid’s equal access provision by failing to
conduct adequate studies prior to changing the reimbursement
114
plan. In the end, the court held that the Medicaid equal access provision did not require the state to conduct studies in
115
advance of the changes. As a result, states in the Seventh
Circuit are not required to conduct studies or “employ any par116
ticular methodology” before setting reimbursement rates.
As a result of these confusing and inconsistent rulings regarding the legal requirements of Medicaid’s equal access provision, states have been left with a lack of uniform standards to
guide their rate-setting process. This has created a two-tiered
rate-setting system, neither of which accomplishes the provision’s goal of ensuring equal access. Some states may feel entirely free to reduce provider rates because they may cut rates
without conducting prior cost studies or engaging in other pro117
cedural requirements. This has led some states to cut provid118
er rates without considering the impact on access to care.
Other states, however, may be unwilling to consider any reasonable reductions in provider rates due to concerns that any
impact on access to care may violate Medicaid’s equal access
119
provision.

112. See id. at 679 (providing a more in-depth analysis of the Court’s holding in Methodist Hosps., Inc. v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1026, 1030 (7th Cir. 1996)).
113. Methodist Hosps., Inc., 91 F.3d at 1027–28.
114. Id. at 1029–30.
115. Id. at 1030–31.
116. Id.
117. For example, states in the Seventh Circuit, where there is no requirement for prior cost studies or other procedural requirements, may cut
provider rates with relatively few procedural barriers. See supra text accompanying notes 112–116.
118. See supra notes 10–12, 54–67 and accompanying text.
119. For example, states in the Ninth Circuit are required to set provider
payment rates that “bear a reasonable relationship” to provider costs, based on
“responsible cost studies, its own or others’, that provide reliable data as basis
for its rate setting.” See supra notes 102–09 and accompanying text.
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B. ENFORCING MEDICAID’S EQUAL ACCESS PROVISION UNDER
§ 1983 AND THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE: INCONSISTENT COURT
RULINGS
In addition to uncertainty regarding how courts will interpret the requirements of Medicaid’s equal access provision,
there is also uncertainty concerning whether Medicaid beneficiaries or providers are able to bring a Medicaid equal access
suit in the first place.
As previously noted, the path to enforcement of Medicaid’s
equal access provision through private suits has slowly eroded
120
over the past ten years. Following the Supreme Court’s 2002
121
decision in Gonzaga, every federal circuit court to consider a
§ 1983 equal access claim brought by providers has held that
Medicaid’s equal access provision does not confer individual
122
rights on providers. For Medicaid recipients, the current judicial enforcement mechanism has resulted in inconsistent court
rulings regarding whether Medicaid beneficiaries may bring
§ 1983 equal access suits. Thus far, the Supreme Court has de123
clined to resolve this issue. As a result, some Medicaid providers and beneficiaries have turned to preemption claims in a
124
last ditch effort to judicially enforce equal access. However,
as with § 1983 claims, it remains unclear whether Medicaid
providers and beneficiaries have a cause of action on the Supremacy Clause.
The 2008 Independent Living case was the first case to
suggest that Medicaid beneficiaries and providers can employ
the Supremacy Clause to enforce Medicaid’s equal access provi125
sion. The U.S. District Court for the Central District of California initially rejected the plaintiff’s argument that it had a
126
cause of action under the Supremacy Clause. After appealing
to the Ninth Circuit, the court remanded the case holding that
a plaintiff could bring a preemption claim to enforce Medicaid’s

120. See supra Part I.C.
121. See supra notes 79–81 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 83–86.
123. See Pediatric Specialty Care, Inc. v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 443
F.3d 1005 (8th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1205 (2007).
124. See supra notes 87–92.
125. See Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc. v. Shewry, No. CV 08-3315, 2008
WL 4298223, at *4 (C.D. Cal. June 25, 2008).
126. Id. at *4–5.
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127

equal access provision. The state appealed all the way to the
128
U.S. Supreme Court.
As noted above, the five-Justice majority declined to decide
the issue of whether Medicaid providers and beneficiaries can
state a valid cause of action under the Supremacy Clause by alleging that a state law reducing provider reimbursement rates
129
conflicts with Medicaid’s equal access provision. However, the
dissent filed by Chief Justice John Roberts, in which Justices
Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Anthony Alito joined,
criticized the majority for evading the question and made it
clear that this “is not a proper role for the Supremacy
130
Clause.” Therefore, although the Court has not directly ruled
on the question whether the Supremacy Clause may be employed to enforce Medicaid’s equal access provision, the opinion
suggests that at least four Justices would respond with a resounding “no.”
Consequently, even if Medicaid beneficiaries and providers
are willing to bring suits under a cloud of uncertainty regarding what standard the courts will apply in interpreting the requirements of Medicaid’s equal access provision, many Medicaid beneficiaries and providers are still left wondering
whether they have a cause of action to even initiate the case.
C. APPROPRIATENESS OF JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT: OTHER
CONSIDERATIONS
There are number of other factors including congressional
intent and federal administrative interpretation, as well as
practical, economic, and ethical considerations that suggest
that the current judicial enforcement mechanism is not a suitable instrument to address equal access violations. Should the
Supreme Court allow Medicaid beneficiaries and/or providers to
bring suit against the state in order to enforce Medicaid’s equal
access provision, these factors must be considered.

127. See Indep. Living Ctr. I, 543 F.3d 1047, 1048–49 (9th Cir. 2008).
128. See id., opinion issued by, 543 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied,
129 S. Ct. 2828 (2009), and on remand to No. CV 08-3315, 2008 WL 3891211
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2008), aff’d sub nom. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc. v.
Maxwell-Jolly, 572 F.3d 644 (9th Cir. 2009), motion to vacate denied, 590 F.3d
725 (9th Cir. 2009), and petition for cert. filed, 2009 WL 907846 (U.S. Apr. 1
2009) (No. 08-1223).
129. See supra Part I.B.
130. Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204, 1213–14
(2012).
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1. Congressional Intent
As noted earlier, the Boren Amendment governed states’
131
Medicaid payments to certain institutional care facilities. The
Amendment’s language was similar to that of the equal access
provision, requiring states to set institutional care provider reimbursement rates that were “reasonable and adequate” to
cover the cost of “efficiently and economically operated facili132
ties.”
In 1990, the Supreme Court held that the Boren
Amendment created a private right of action enforceable under
133
§ 1983. Following this ruling, federal circuit courts across the
country held that Medicaid beneficiaries and providers could
sue to enforce various provisions of the Medicaid Act under
134
§ 1983.
Legislative history suggests that Congress repealed the
Boren Amendment with the express intent of reversing the Supreme Court’s 1990 holding in Wilder that the Boren Amend135
ment conferred an enforceable federal statutory right. In a
report from the House Committee on the Budget supporting the
repeal of the Boren Amendment under the Balanced Budget
Act, the Committee stated, “[i]t is the Committee’s intention
that, following enactment of this Act, neither this nor any other
provision of [42 U.S.C. § 1396a] will be interpreted as establishing a cause of action for hospitals and nursing facilities relative
136
to the adequacy of the rates they receive.” This suggests that
by repealing the Boren Amendment, Congress intended to prevent providers from bringing suit to regulate Medicaid reim137
bursement rates.
2. Federal Administrative Interpretation
In addition to congressional intent, federal administrative
interpretation of the role Medicaid’s equal access provision
plays within the joint federal-state Medicaid program also sug131. See supra notes 43–45 and accompanying text.
132. Guiltinan, supra note 16, at 1597 n.104 (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396a(a)(13)(A) (2006)).
133. Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 509–10 (1990).
134. See supra note 76.
135. Guiltinan, supra note 16, at 1598 (citing 104 H.R. REP. NO. 105-149,
at 591 (1997)); see also H.R. REP. NO. 105-149, at 590–91 (“A number of Federal courts have ruled that State systems failed to meet the test of ‘reasonableness’ and some States have had to increase payments to these providers as a
result of these judicial interpretations.”).
136. Guiltinan, supra note 16, at 1598 n.112.
137. See id. at 1598.
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gests that judicial enforcement is not an appropriate mechanism to address equal access violations.
In a brief filed with the Supreme Court on behalf of the
Obama Administration, the federal administration officially
took a stance against the use of § 1983 by Medicaid beneficiar138
ies or providers to enforce Medicaid’s equal access provision.
The Obama Administration maintained that such lawsuits
“would not be compatible” with the means of enforcement envisioned by Congress, which relies on the Secretary of HHS to
139
ensure compliance.
The brief argued that determinations
about how to measure a State’s compliance with general standards of economy, efficiency, quality of care, and sufficiency of
payments to ensure access are “ones properly made by HHS
through the exercise of its expert judgment and its bilateral re140
lationship with the State.” The Obama Administration also
argued that the use of the Supremacy Clause to enforce Medi141
caid’s equal access provision was inappropriate:
[Medicaid’s equal access provision] is a provision of a cooperative federal-state program enacted pursuant to Congress’s Spending Clause
authority, as to which Congress neither provided an express right of
action for private parties nor conferred individually enforceable
rights. Recognition of a nonstatutory cause of action for Medicaid providers and beneficiaries in this setting would be in tension with the
nature of the federal-state relationship and the enforcement scheme
142
contemplated by the statute.

Enforcement of Medicaid’s equal access provision through a
private judicial enforcement mechanism flies directly in the
face of the federal government’s interpretation of the role of
Medicaid’s equal access provision within the statute’s broader
federal-state Medicaid structure.
3. Practical, Economic, and Ethical Considerations
Finally, in addition to separation of powers concerns, practical, economic, and ethical considerations also suggest that judicial enforcement of Medicaid’s equal access provision is inappropriate.

138. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., 132 S. Ct. 1204 (2012) (Nos. 09958, 09-1158, 10-283), 2011 WL 2132705.
139. See id. at *24–25.
140. Id. at *31.
141. Id. at *16–32.
142. Id. at *25.
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a. Practical Considerations
On a practical level, requiring individual low-income Medicaid beneficiaries to sue the state in order to ensure that they
have access to needed health care providers is unrealistic. Most
143
equal access suits have been brought by providers or by pro144
viders in association with Medicaid beneficiaries. This is likely due to the inability of Medicaid beneficiaries to fund their
145
own judicial enforcement actions. In order to qualify for Medicaid, individuals must have income and resources that total to
146
a value less than a specified amount. Although income eligibility levels vary by state and eligibility category (e.g., pregnant
women, children, working individuals with disabilities, or lowincome Medicare beneficiaries), Medicaid assistance is limited
147
to those in financial need. Equal access lawsuits have traditionally been brought by or in conjunction with financially
148
equipped Medicaid providers.
However, as stated earlier, following Gonzaga, every federal circuit court that has considered a § 1983 equal access claim
brought by providers has held that they do not have individual
149
rights under Medicaid’s equal access provision. Enforcement
of the equal access provision under a § 1983 cause of action is
constructively prohibited for providers. As a result, Medicaid
beneficiaries may no longer be able to rely on providers to fund
equal access suits.

143. See, e.g., Visiting Nurse Ass’n of N. Shore, Inc. v. Bullen, 93 F.3d 997,
999 (1st Cir. 1996) (health care providers initiated action); Methodist Hosps.,
Inc. v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1026, 1027 (7th Cir. 1996) (physicians and hospitals
brought action).
144. See, e.g., Indep. Living Ctr. I, 543 F.3d 1047, 1048–50 (9th Cir. 2008)
(action brought by Medi-Cal providers and beneficiaries); Equal Access for El
Paso v. Hawkins, 509 F.3d 697, 699–701 (5th Cir. 2007) (action brought by
providers in association with Medicaid beneficiaries); Pediatric Specialty Care,
Inc. v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 443 F.3d 1005, 1009 (8th Cir. 2006) (action
brought by providers and parents of three Medicaid recipients); Ark. Med.
Soc’y, Inc. v. Reynolds, 6 F.3d 519, 522 (8th Cir. 1993) (action brought by Medicaid providers, professional associations, and beneficiaries).
145. See SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 25, at 6–7 (noting that in order to
qualify for Medicaid, individuals must meet income and resource eligibility
requirements).
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See cases cited supra notes 143–44.
149. See sources cited supra note 83; see also Sayles, supra note 86, at 130
(“[E]ach court, when confronted with the issue, found that providers are not
conferred rights under § 1396a(a)(30).”).
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Even if the Supreme Court holds that providers may bring
suit using a preemption claim, providers may be less likely to
instigate action due to the limited relief available under the
Supremacy Clause. Unlike § 1983 actions, plaintiffs cannot receive money damages or attorney fees in a suit brought under
150
the Supremacy Clause. Plaintiffs may seek prospective injunctive and declaratory relief, but are prohibited from receiv151
ing relief for past violations. Due to the limited relief available under the Supremacy Clause, providers may be less likely
to initiate an equal access suit.
b. Economic Considerations
On an economic level, requiring Medicaid beneficiaries and
providers to bring suit in order to enforce Medicaid’s equal access provision makes inefficient use of resources. Plaintiffs and
152
judges are generally not experts on the Medicaid program. As
a result, judicial enforcement of Medicaid’s equal access provision has led to the development and application of different legal standards. As noted previously, the Ninth, Seventh, Third,
and Eighth Circuits apply different legal standards when interpreting the requirements of Medicaid’s equal access provi153
sion. Acknowledging this fact, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals found that Medicaid’s equal access provision was “ill154
suited to judicial remedy.” In coming to its holding, the court
held that the interpretation and balancing of the provision’s objectives of “efficiency, economy, and quality of care . . . would
involve making policy decisions for which [the] court has little
155
expertise.”
The federal government has advanced the argument that
federal health officials are better equipped than judges to bal156
ance equal access concerns with other policy objectives. In its
brief submitted to the Supreme Court, the federal government
argued that federal administrative process provides the necessary “expertise, uniformity, widespread consultation, and re150. Guiltinan, supra note 16, at 1620 (citing David Sloss, Constitutional
Remedies for Statutory Violations, 89 IOWA L. REV. 355, 389 (2004)).
151. Id.
152. See Westside Mothers v. Olszewski, 454 F.3d 532, 543 (6th Cir. 2006)
(arguing that the judiciary is “ill-suited” to enforce Medicaid’s equal access
provision).
153. See supra Part II.A.
154. Westside Mothers, 454 F.3d at 543.
155. Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
156. See Pear, supra note 90.
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sulting administrative guidance” that often accompanies agen157
cy decision-making. For these reasons, federal health officials
are better equipped to enforce Medicaid’s equal access provision
in a consistent and efficient manner.
c. Ethical Considerations
Finally, administration of Medicaid’s equal access provision through an enforcement system which is not uniform in its
decision making and readily accessible to beneficiaries may be
considered unethical by some.
Congress enacted the Medicaid Act with the intent of lending a helping hand to many of the nation’s most needy individ158
uals. Subsequently, acknowledging the importance of providing not only health care coverage, but also meaningful access to
159
care, Congress enacted the equal access provision. The goal of
these congressional enactments was to lessen the hardships
carried by our nation’s poorest and neediest citizens. Yet, congressional intent may be compromised by placing the burden of
equal access enforcement on those least able to bear it.
With financial and expert resources, the state and federal
governments are better able to bear the burden of ensuring en160
forcement of the equal access provision. It is for this reason
that a federal regulatory enforcement approach may be considered a more ethical and appropriate way to assure access to
health care through oversight and enforcement of Medicaid’s
equal access provision.
III. A FEDERAL REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT
APPROACH
As demonstrated throughout Part II, many factors suggest
the need for an alternative equal access enforcement approach.
This Note proposes implementation of robust federal regulatory
157. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
supra note 138, at *32 (quoting Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 292
(2002) (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment)).
158. See Moncrieff, supra note 13, at 675 (noting that enactment of the
Medicaid Act was intended to provide many of the nation’s poor passage into
the upper tier of the health care system).
159. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
160. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 138, at *31–32 (arguing that unlike plaintiffs and judges, the
federal government has the requisite expertise to address equal access violations); SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 25, at 6 (noting that Medicaid beneficiaries are financially needy).
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enforcement supported by adequate financial assistance as an
alternative means by which to enforce Medicaid’s equal access
provision. This Part first examines the current federal enforcement system and suggests support for a federal regulatory
framework that promulgates clear and consistent guidelines for
states to follow when setting reimbursement rates. Next, it argues that in order for states to accept and implement a comprehensive federally imposed equal access regulatory framework, the system must be supported by sufficient financial
assistance. Finally, it explains why the federal government has
both the power and the duty to create a standardized federally
based regulatory enforcement scheme.
A. THE CURRENT FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM
States must set their reimbursement policies in state Medicaid plans, and changes in those policies must be reflected in
state-plan amendments (SPAs), which are then reviewed by
161
HHS. When the federal government asks states to provide
justification for the rate changes, they usually respond with a
162
general statement assuring that access will not be affected.
When the government then asks for further details on the
methodology used by the state in its determination, generally
only a few states show that they relied on actual data in mak163
ing this determination. Absent actual data, the federal gov164
ernment generally relies on a state’s general assurances. As a
result, states have been able to implement rate changes with
relatively little fear that the federal government will reject
165
their SPAs for violating Medicaid’s equal access provision. To
assure uniformity in the application of the Medicaid equal access provision, the federal government must implement a more
robust regulatory approach to the enforcement of this provision.
161. See supra notes 25–29 and accompanying text.
162. Medicaid Program; Methods for Assuring Access to Covered Medicaid
Services, 76 Fed. Reg. 26,343, 26,348 (proposed May 6, 2011) (to be codified at
42 C.F.R. pt. 447).
163. Id. Additionally, of the states that actually rely on data, most focus
“on historical levels of provider enrollment and their” substantively foundationless “belief that providers would not disenroll based on a reduction in
payment[].” Id.
164. See id. at 26,348–49 (“[W]e [HHS] have generally relied upon State
assurances . . . to make decisions on proposed rate reduction SPAs.”).
165. The federal government has only rejected SPAs with proposed rate
reductions in a few extreme instances. See id. at 26,349.
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B. A ROBUST FEDERAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
Under the Medicaid Act, the Secretary of HHS has broad
authority to issue regulations “as may be necessary to the efficient administration of the functions with which [she] is
166
charged under [the Medicaid Act].” For example, the Secre167
tary has invoked this power to impose upper payment limits.
The Secretary may also use this power to implement a robust
federal regulatory framework to enforce Medicaid’s equal access provision.
1. Proposed Federal Enforcement Scheme
Invoking this power in May 2011, the federal government
through the Centers of Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)
proposed a rule that would create a standardized, transparent
process for states to follow in assuring that provider payments
are consistent with “efficiency, economy, and quality of care
and are sufficient to enlist enough providers so that care and
168
services are available.” The proposed rule offers guidelines on
data collection efforts and the public process that states must
follow in order to demonstrate that the rate-setting process is
consistent with the requirements of Medicaid’s equal access
169
provision.
Under the proposed rule, states would be required to submit equal access analyses based on data collected during the
prior year along with any SPA that reduces or restructures
170
provider payment rates. CMS would then review these analyses to make sure the state collected and analyzed all relevant
data to ensure substantive compliance with equal access re171
quirements. While the sufficiency of this process is somewhat
172
debated, this regulatory proposal is a key starting point for
166. SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 25, at 136 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1302(a)
(2006)).
167. See id.
168. Medicaid Program; Methods for Assuring Access to Covered Medicaid
Services, 76 Fed. Reg. at 26,342 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(30)(A)). As of April
2013, nearly two years after it was first proposed, no action has been taken on
the proposed rule.
169. Id. at 26,349.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. See, e.g., Joint Comments of Physician Organizations at 2–5, commenting on Medicaid Program; Methods for Assuring Access to Covered Medicaid Services, 76 Fed. Reg. 26,342, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/
resources/doc/washington/medicaid-access-review-sign-on-letter-05july2011
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the creation of clear and consistent guidelines for state to follow
in setting provider reimbursement rates in compliance with
Medicaid’s equal access provision.
2. Increased Federal Financial Assistance
However, in order to create a uniform and transparent process that is palatable to the states, a successful federal regulatory scheme should include increased federal financial assistance to conduct the time- and resource-intensive equal access
analyses.
As stated previously, state participation in the Medicaid
173
program is entirely optional. Until this point in time, every
state has chosen to participate in the joint state-federal pro174
gram. However, challenged by strict federal requirements,
potential expansion of Medicaid eligibility, and budget shortfalls, lawmakers in nearly a dozen states have stated that they
are considering opting out of the Medicaid program altogeth175
er. They argue that states could provide more efficient and
cost-effective care for children, individuals with disabilities and
the impoverished by opting out of the Medicaid program and
176
establishing a state-based health insurance system.
Although it is debated whether opting out of the joint
state-federal Medicaid program would be a viable option for
177
states,
should this happen, eligible beneficiaries in these
states would no longer be protected under Medicaid’s equal access provision. While implementation of a federal regulatory
framework is an important first step to improving the enforcement of Medicaid’s equal access provision, without the provision of additional financial assistance, states may view the federal government’s proposed equal access enforcement rule as
the final incentive for their decision to opt out of the joint statefederal program.

.pdf (questioning adequacy of data elements requirements, enforcement and
oversight mechanisms, and exclusion of managed care).
173. SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 25, at 130.
174. Id.
175. See Emily Ramshaw & Marilyn Serafini, Battle Lines Drawn over
Medicaid in Texas, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/
11/12/us/politics/12ttmedicaid.html (citing Republican lawmakers in Texas arguing that strings attached to Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance
Program are bankrupting the state).
176. Id.
177. See id.
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One way to ease the administrative burden placed on
states by the proposed federal rule would be to fully fund or, at
a minimum, provide a higher federal administrative matching
rate to conduct equal access analyses. The federal government
matches administrative cost incurred by state Medicaid pro178
grams.
Most types of allowable administrative costs are
179
matched at 50%.
However, state expenditures for certain
types of administrative functions are matched at a higher rate
180
of 75%. In addition, the federal government matches 90% of
start-up expenses related to the operation of Medicaid information management systems and state Medicaid fraud control
181
units.
In its proposed rule, CMS proposes that states have the
ongoing responsibility to monitor access to care and conduct periodic reviews of compliance with Medicaid’s equal access pro182
vision. Under an increased federal matching approach, the
federal government could match state Medicaid programs at
90% for administrative costs related to the start-up of Medicaid
equal access monitoring and compliance management systems.
Additionally, because some states may not have previously engaged in many or any equal access reviews, the start-up phase
could also include higher matching rates for initial equal access
reviews investigating and resolving current violations. Once
the initial equal access monitoring systems have been established, the federal government could match state expenditures
183
related to equal access data collection efforts at 75%. The in178. SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 25, at 144–45. Federal Medicaid funding comes from general revenues. APRIL GRADY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS
22849, MEDICAID FINANCING CRS-3 (2008), available at http://assets.opencrs
.com/rpts/RS22849_20080326.pdf.
179. SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 25, at 145.
180. Id. These administrative services include:
[C]ompensation or training of physicians, nurses, and other skilled
professional medical personnel used by the state Medicaid agency (or
other state or local agencies) to administer the program; operation of
a Medicaid management information system[]; surveys and certification of nursing facilities; performance of medical and utilization review or quality assurance by a Quality Improvement Organization . . .
or External Quality Review Organization []; operation of state Medicaid fraud control units.
Id.
181. Id.
182. Medicaid Program; Methods for Assuring Access to Covered Medicaid
Services, 76 Fed. Reg. 26,342, 26,344 (proposed May 6, 2011) (to be codified at
42 C.F.R. pt. 447).
183. See id. at 26,344–61 (requiring states to conduct these data collection

2013]

ENSURING EQUAL ACCESS

2349

creased federal matching system would incentivize states to establish equal access compliance mechanisms and conduct ongoing periodic reviews of compliance with Medicaid’s equal access
provision.
C. CHALLENGES TO A “FEDERAL” REGULATORY APPROACH
In addition to concerns related to the administrative and
financial burdens placed on states by a federal regulatory enforcement scheme, some states have also expressed concern
with the federal government’s role in state Medicaid affairs.
As noted previously, Medicaid is structured as a coopera184
tive federal-state program. Under the joint federal-state Medicaid system, states have broad flexibility to establish service
delivery systems, “to design the procedures for enrolling providers . . . , and to set the methods for establishing provider
185
payment rates.” Some opponents of a standardized federal
regulatory approach argue that this structure is evidence of
Congress’s intent for states to have broad flexibility to set pro186
vider rates. In addition, they argue that such flexibility is
critical in order to allow review of beneficiary access to evolve
over time, and for states to be able to implement effective and
efficient approaches that are appropriate to their local and
187
changing circumstances. Consequently, agencies and officials
responsible for administering the Medicaid program in a number of states have taken a stance against the federal government’s proposed rule contending that the federally-based equal
enforcement scheme infringes upon the state’s broad discretion
188
to set provider rates.
However, the federal government has both the power and
the duty under the Medicaid Act to issue regulations aimed at
ensuring equal access to care. As noted above, the Secretary of
HHS has the power to issue regulations necessary to efficiently

efforts when the state proposes a rate change and on a regular periodic basis).
184. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
185. See Medicaid Program; Methods for Assuring Access to Covered Medicaid Services, 76 Fed. Reg. at 26,343.
186. See Joint Comments of 17 States and State Medicaid Agencies, Comments on the Medicaid Program: Methods for Assuring Access to Covered Medicaid Services, REGULATIONS.GOV (July 10, 2011), http://www.regulations
.gov/#!documentDetail;D=CMS-2011-0062-0179 (follow “View Attachment”
hyperlink).
187. See id. at 2.
188. See id. at 1–11.
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189

administer the Medicaid program. In addition, the federal
government also concedes that it has a “responsibility” under
the Medicaid Act to ensure sufficient beneficiary access to cov190
ered services.
Due to the lack of prior federal guidance on this issue,
states have been able to make provider rate changes without
considering the impact on access to care for Medicaid benefi191
ciaries. This is due in part to the lack of guidance regarding
the procedures that must be followed in complying with the re192
quirements of Medicaid’s equal access provision. Aware of the
193
issues that have arisen due to the lack of federal guidance, it
is the duty of the federal government to create a uniform and
transparent process for states to follow to ensure equal access.
Implementation of a robust federal regulatory enforcement
approach is a necessary and important part of a successful
equal access enforcement scheme. A federal regulatory scheme
will help ensure equal access by providing states with clear and
consistent guidelines to follow when setting reimbursement
rates. However, it is imperative to provide ample financial support to make this federally centered regulatory approach palatable to cash-strapped states.
CONCLUSION
With over sixty million poor and disabled Americans relying on Medicaid to provide access to health care and millions
194
more expected to join the ranks over the next few years, ensuring that beneficiaries have meaningful access to health care
providers is of utmost importance. However, if healthcare providers are unwilling to participate in the Medicaid program,
many beneficiaries will be left without access to needed care.
Acknowledging the importance of ensuring provider participation in the Medicaid program, Congress passed the equal access
provision to ensure that states reimburse providers at a level
189. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
190. See Medicaid Program; Methods for Assuring Access to Covered Medicaid Services, 76 Fed. Reg. at 26,344.
191. Id. at 26,343; see supra notes 10–11, 54–56, 117–19 and accompanying
text.
192. See supra notes 117–19 and accompanying text.
193. Medicaid Program; Methods for Assuring Access to Covered Medicaid
Services, 76 Fed. Reg. 26,344 (acknowledging that issues have arisen due to
the lack of federal guidance).
194. See MEDICAID PROGRAM AT A GLANCE, supra note 12; see also supra
note 23 and accompanying text.
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that ensures quality of care and sufficient provider participation. Nevertheless, with minimal oversight and fear of reprisal
from the federal government, many states have reduced provider reimbursement rates, some in violation of Medicaid’s
equal access provision. As a result, both Medicaid beneficiaries
and providers have had to rely on judicial enforcement via private suits brought against state Medicaid agencies to enforce
Medicaid’s equal access provision.
A number of factors including inconsistent circuit rulings
interpreting the legal requirements of Medicaid’s equal access
provision and conflicting rulings on whether Medicaid beneficiaries or providers are able to bring a Medicaid equal access
suit in the first place, coupled with a number of other pragmatic and ethical considerations suggest that the current judicial
enforcement mechanism is not an appropriate method by which
to enforce Medicaid’s equal access provision. Implementation of
a federal equal access regulatory approach that is supported by
adequate federal financial support provides an alternative
means by which to ensure equal access by creating the uniform
and transparent enforcement mechanism needed to enforce
Medicaid’s equal access provision in a practical, economic, and
ethical manner.

